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State capture and corruption are widespread phenomena across the globe, but their empirical study 
still lacks sufficient analytical tools. This paper develops a new conceptual and analytical framework 
for gauging state capture based on micro-level contractual networks in public procurement. To this 
end, it establishes a novel measure of corruption risk in government contracting focusing on the 
behaviour of individual organisations. Then, it identifies clusters of high corruption risk organisations 
in the full contractual network of procuring authorities and their suppliers using formal social 
network analysis. Densely connected clusters of high corruption risk organisations are denoted as 
the domain of state capture. It demonstrates the power of the new analytical framework by 
exploring how the radical centralisation of the governing elite following the 2010 elections in 
Hungary impacted on centralisation of state capture. Findings indicate the feasibility and usefulness 
of such micro-level approach to corruption and state capture. Better understanding the network 
structure of corruption and state capture opens new avenues for research and policy on anti-
corruption, budget deficit, market competition, and quality of democracy. Supporting further 





There has been intense scholarly interest in state capture across the globe, although virtually 
every study has had to rely either on qualitative data lacking sufficient breadth, or on survey 
data lacking sufficient reliability. These methodological weaknesses have spawned a rich 
theoretical literature but relatively meagre empirical material against which to evaluate it. 
With the recent availability of reliable micro-level data on corruption and favouritism in 
public procurement (Auriol, Flochel, and Straub 2011; Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti 2009; 
Klasnja 2016), scholars can begin to rigorously test theories of state capture and investigate 
underlying actor networks and corrupt transactions. 
It is our starting point that state capture is not just widespread corruption. Rather, its essence 
lies in a distinct network structure in which corrupt actors cluster around parts of the state 
allowing them to act collectively in pursuance of their private goals to the detriment of the 
public good. By analysing the distribution of corrupt transactions and clustering of corrupt 
actors across organisations, it is possible to estimate the degree of state capture. For example, 
it becomes possible to distinguish between localised and systemic forms of state capture 
where in the first case only some public and private organisations enter into a capture 
relationship with their ‘islands’ remaining relatively autonomous, while in the second case, 
captured organisations are linked to each other and controlled by a country-wide elite. 
In order to bridge the gap between state capture theory and empirics, this paper develops a 
new conceptual and analytical framework for gauging state capture based on micro-level 
contractual networks in public procurement. The goal of this analytical framework is to 
determine precisely whether state capture took place in particular parts of the state; and if so, 
to help uncover its degree and structure.  
Identifying state capture in organisational networks rests on a novel measure of corruption 
risk in government contracting (Corruption Risk Index). This measure captures the likelihood 
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of corruption occurring in a given tender by screening a wide range of micro-level ‘red flags’ 
such as a short deadline for submitting bids. 
Establishing the structure and degree of state capture opens up many ways for analysing its 
causes and effects. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of this novel approach, the 
association between the organisational structure of the governing elite and the structure of 
state capture are explored using the change of government of Hungary in 2009-2012, albeit 
no causal claim is made due to the multitude of intervening factors. This is a highly relevant 
question on its own, as, to take one example, many anti-corruption efforts fail because they 
misdiagnose corruption as a principal-agent problem and miss the elite-driven character of 
state capture (Mills 1970; Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2013). 
Pursuing these ends extends our current knowledge in at least two ways: first and most 
importantly, it gives a well-documented and widely deployable toolkit for scholars to 
measure state capture exploiting the micro-level structure of corruption. This, hopefully, will 
generate further scholarly interest in the empirical study of state capture. Second, it also 
provides a brief empirical test for the theories of state capture, in particular on how elite 
centralisation impacts on state capture structure, using the example of Hungary in 2009-2012. 
This is a crucial question as it has wide-ranging ramifications for many economic, social, and 
political factors. 
Findings highlight the conceptual and empirical usefulness of the proposed approach to state 
capture. The proposed framework allows us to establish the risk of corruption, i.e. the 
likelihood of corruption occurring, in government contracting at the transaction level, while 
also providing clear guidance on how to use such micro-level data and indicators to precisely 
identify the location, degree, and structure of state capture. The method claims general 
applicability to countries with regulated and transparent public procurement markets 
including OECD countries and most middle-income countries (OECD 2015). Applying the 
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framework to Hungary in 2009-2012 demonstrates the methodology’s research merits. It 
reveals that the Hungarian state was partially captured in 2009-2012, with high corruption-
risk organisations becoming more central as a more centralised governing party takes power 
in 2011-2012 which coincides with qualitative accounts of the events. Understanding how 
elites organise state capture in middle-income countries has wide-ranging ramifications for 
anti-corruption interventions, management of budget deficits, market competition, and quality 
of democracy. 
Even though the main focus of this analysis is public procurement corruption, findings also 
provide an indication of corruption in a more general sense as public procurement represents 
one of the principal vehicles for rent extraction across the globe. This is reflected, for 
example, in corruption surveys where public procurement is systematically named as the 
most corrupt area of government activities (OECD 2007, 9). This is not surprising given the 
high degree of discretion inherent in public procurement decisions and the large portion of 
public spending involved: between 20% and 50% of OECD countries’ public budgets (OECD 
2011 table 40.2). While robust evidence is lacking, corrupt rents earned through 
particularistic allocation of public procurement contracts are often directly linked to political 
party finances and democratic party competition (OECD 2014; Transparency International 
2012). 
The paper is structured as follows: It first sets out the conceptual framework. Second, it 
develops the novel measure of corruption risks in public procurement transactions focusing 
on binary contractual relationships between organisations. Third, it identifies organisational 
clusters based on their corruption level and network connections. Fourth, it systematically 
explores how the change in the internal composition of the governing elite (i.e. becoming 
more centralised) impacts the network structure of corruption in public procurement. 
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2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
While there are many competing definitions of corruption (Johnston 1996), we adopt a broad 
approach which is adept at capturing high-level political corruption in situations where even 
some regulations could be enacted to serve rent extraction. Thus, in the context of public 
procurement, institutionalised grand corruption denotes the allocation and performance of 
public procurement contracts by bending prior explicit rules and principles of good public 
procurement such as public procurement laws in order to benefit a closed network while 
denying access to all others (for a related discussion see Kaufmann and Vicente 2011; 
Mungiu-Pippidi 2006; OECD 2007). This definition of corruption beyond simple bribery in 
public administration is well fitted to the context of public procurement where political 
discretion is broad and political and technocratic actors necessarily co-determine decision. 
Prior explicit rules and principles provide the benchmark for an impartial and universalistic 
allocation of public resources as opposed to partiality and particularism along friendship or 
kinship lines (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). In addition, prior explicit rules and principles 
mandate open access and fair competition for public procurement contracts and must be 
violated by corrupt groups if they are to generate corrupt rents and allocate them to members 
of their network (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Such a definition of corruption is 
directly measured by the Corruption Risk Index (CRI) developed by earlier scholarship 
(Fazekas, Tóth, and King 2016). 
Similar to corruption, there are many definitions of state capture, many of which focus on law 
making instead of public spending (Hellman et al. 2000; Slinko, Yakovlev, and Zhuravskaya 
2005). A range of scholars share the understanding that state capture is a group phenomenon 
whereby some members of the business and/or political elite appropriates some parts or 
functions of the state and uses its resources to the benefit of the group while harming the 
public good (Grzymala-Busse 2008). This understanding of state capture does not imply 
whether it is business capturing the state, or the other way around, or both at the same time. 
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In the context of public procurement, state capture most likely involves targeting public 
organisations which manage the distribution and performance of contracts as these are the 
primary sources of rents to be extracted. When a public organisation is captured by private 
interests it loses its autonomy to act in furtherance of public goals which manifests in its 
inability to contract competitively achieving low price and high quality. 
Hence, it is possible to link institutionalised grand corruption to state capture in the domain of 
public procurement by focusing attention on the distribution and clustering of corruption and 
network relations of key actors underlying collective action (Uribe 2014). On the one hand, 
corruption without state capture in public procurement is understood as institutionalised 
grand corruption distributed across the organisational network randomly. Corruption 
randomly arising implies atomised and isolated breakdowns of institutional integrity without 
any elite group seizing control of the state. On the other hand, state capture in public 
procurement is defined as institutionalised grand corruption clustered on certain public 
organisations which cease to serve public goals, instead are used for the captor group’s own 
objectives. This implies that the simple quantitative characteristic - amount of corruption - 
does not automatically translate into state capture; rather its particular distribution is what 
matters. Hence, varying distributional characteristics of corruption can lead to a qualitatively 
different state operational logic even given the same quantity of corruption. Clusters of high-
corruption transactions can arise both at the level of an individual organisation, implying that 
it is only that particular organisation which is captured (local capture), while it can also arise 
at the level of multiple organisations implying that there is a larger part of the public sector 
captured (global capture). Theoretically, the extent of state capture can range from a single 
captured organisation to the capture of every single organisation. 
In order to convincingly link institutionalised grand corruption to state capture by analysing 
organisational networks, it is imperative to first establish a thorough understanding of what 
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the networks truly represent. The network of organisations consists of public organisations 
(issuers of tenders) and private firms (winners of tenders) where each tie represents a 
contractual relationship between the two. Institutionalised grand corruption as measured by 
CRI is a characteristic of the contract linking public organisations to private firms. In this 
sense, a high corruption-risk contract represents a corrupt bond between the decision makers 
in public and private organisations, creating a relationship based on trust, shared experience, 
and jointly extracted rent (della Porta and Vannucci 1999). The clustering of high corruption- 
risk contracts among organisations signals that the involved public and private actors have 
formed a group based on regular interactions which can act collectively to seize control of 
government contracting in pursuance of their private-regarding goals. State capture is 
unlikely to arise without such clustering of transactions as corrupt relationships are costly to 
set up and the threat of detection makes group membership turnover highly risky 
(Lambsdorff 2002). Hence, the degree and strength of such a clustering measure the extent of 
state capture ranging from partially appropriated state to a near complete fusion of private 
interests and state functions (Wedel 2003). 
The different distributions of corruption and state capture are depicted in Figure 1 in a 
simplified form in order to shed more light on our proposed link between corruption and state 
capture. Here, I1-I4 represent 4 different issuers (public organisations), S1-S4 represent 4 
different suppliers (private organisations), the dashed arrows between them denote low 
corruption-risk contracts, and the solid arrows indicate high corruption risk contracts. C1 and 
C2 are two clusters of contracting organisations. In the top left panel (i), a corruption-free 
state is depicted, consisting of two contractual clusters, each of which is largely free of 
corruption and hence also of state capture . In the top right panel (ii), corruption displays a 
random pattern without being organised into clusters of corrupt organisations. As each cluster 
of contracting organisations has both high- and low- corruption links, no state capture occurs. 
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Such a pattern suggests occasional weaknesses of the integrity framework without an 
extensive breakdown of institutional autonomy. 
In the bottom left panel (iii), corruption is organised along the lines of clusters of contracting 
organisations with one cluster (C1) containing only high corruption contracts while the other 
cluster (C2) contains only low corruption contracts. In this situation, public organisations I1 
and I2 are likely to have lost all of their institutional autonomy in disbursing public funds 
through public contracting, while I3 and I4 have managed to maintain their contracting 
autonomy. Because some public organisations are captured while others are not, this state can 
be denoted as a partially appropriated state (Wedel 2003). If cluster C1 had consisted of only 
one public organisation, it could have been denoted as local capture. As the cluster already 
contains two public organisations it represents a position somewhat removed from local 
capture and closer to global capture.  
In the bottom right panel (iv), every contract is of high corruption risk, rendering the state 
fully captured, or, to put it another way, the network exhibits global capture. As there are two 
separate contractual networks, the network configuration suggests an oligarchic structure 
whereby different captor groups target different sets of organisations. Nevertheless, this 
would need to be confirmed by analysis of the personal networks of key office-holders in the 
clustered organisations. It is possible that the absence of a contractual link is the result of 
market and/or geographic separations while personal ties assure a single captor group. 
The four above types are of a highly simplified nature compared to the empirical data we 
analyse. There are three notable extensions to these models: first, clusters are unlikely to be 
completely separate, but rather are likely to be characterised by a dense network of intra-
cluster contractual links, but some sparse relations among clusters. Second, clusters may only 
differ in the degree of corruption risk associated with their intra-cluster contractual 
relationships; that is, some clusters are expected to have dominantly high corruption-risk 
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contracts while others dominantly low corruption-risk contracts. Third, our indicator of 
corruption risks (CRI) of contractual relations is not binary but rather a continuous measure, 
making the analysis much more fine-tuned than the simple binary categorisation of contracts. 
Using the above conceptualisation of state capture, this article investigates the relationship 
between governing elite composition and the structure of state capture. The starting point is 
that in a typical case, captor groups have different degrees of centralisation, some resemble a 
loose coalition of diverse actors (i.e. oligarchy), others a highly centralised group with a strict 
hierarchical structure (i.e. hierarchy). Internal organisation determines the degree to which 
they are capable of collective action such as managing rent extraction. Hence, we can 
hypothesize that captor groups organise rent extraction in line with their internal composition. 
That is, decentralised captor groups would organise rent extraction in public procurement in a 
decentralised way. This is reflected in the organisational network consisting of multiple 
distinct clusters of high corruption organisations. A centralised captor group would organise 
rent extraction in public procurement in a centralised way. This would be reflected in the 
organisational network as a tightly knit cluster occupying the centre of the graph. Since the 
composition of the elite in Hungary changes radically (i.e. becomes centralised) in 2010 
following the landslide victory of the conservative party (Fidesz), this provides an 
appropriate testing ground for theory. In this context, the competing hypotheses to be tested 
are: 
H0: Elite centralisation of 2011-2012 did not change the central position of captured 
organisations; 




3. THE DATA 
3.1. Public procurement data from Hungary, 2009-2012 
The database derives from Hungarian public procurement announcements from 2009-2012 
(this database is referred to as PP henceforth). The data represent a complete database of all 
public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement Law. PP 
contains variables appearing in 1) calls for tenders, 2) contract award notices, 3) contract 
modification notices, 4) contract completion announcements, and 5) administrative 
corrections notices. As not all of these kinds of announcements appear for each procedure, we 
only have the variables deriving from contract award notices consistently across every 
procedure. Comparable datasets exist or can be constructed from public records in most 
developed countries including every EU member state, Russia, and the US at least since 
2008. 
These documents are published online in the Public Procurement Bulletin
1
. As there is no 
readily available database, we used a crawler algorithm
2
 to capture the text of every 
announcement. Then, applying a complex automatic and manual text mining strategy, we 
created a structured database that contains variables with clear meaning and well-defined 
categories. As the original texts available online contain a range of errors, inconsistencies, 
and omissions, we applied several correction measures to arrive at a database of sufficient 
quality for scientific research. For a full description of database development, see Fazekas 
and Tóth (2016). The database is downloadable at digiwhist.eu/resources/data. 
A potential limitation of our database is that it only contains information on public 
procurement procedures administered under the Hungarian Public Procurement Law as there 
is no central depository of other contracts. The law defines the minimum estimated contract 
value for its application depending on the type of announcing body and the kind of products 
                                                          
1
 See: http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/nid/KE (in Hungarian) 
2
 For a gentle introduction see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_crawler  
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or services to be procured (for example, from 1 January 2012, classical issuers have to follow 
the national regulations if they procure services for more than 8 million HUF or 27 thousand 
EUR). Hence PP is a biased sample of total Hungarian public procurement, containing only 
the larger and more heavily regulated cases. This bias makes PP well suited for studying 
more costly and high-stakes corruption, since coverage is close to complete. In spite of any 
such limitations, a large amount of data is available: over 53,000 contracts awarded worth 
over 11 billion EUR, amounting to over 3% of total GDP in 2009-2012 (Table 1) 
3.2 Network data from Hungary, 2009-2012 
This public procurement database allows for very detailed and complex network analyses as 
there are at least three distinct actors recorded: 1) public organisations or issuers, 2) private 
organisations or suppliers/winners, and 3) procurement advisors or brokers. Networks can be 
constructed with contracts defining ties between actors, but other links are also possible such 
as co-participation in a bid or consortium, issuers procuring together, shared company 
ownership, or a shared set of managers or board members. The fact that the database records 
transactions on a daily basis opens up the possibility of a wide range of analyses. 
In order to concentrate on the aspects of the available rich dataset most relevant to research 




Table 2). First, only two types of actors were selected resulting in a two-mode or bipartite 
network structure: issuers and winners. While there has been a lot of scientific discussion 
about the crucial role of informality and the consequent secondary importance of formal 
structures, public as well as private organisations still represent specific investments into 
means of rent extraction for corrupt groups. By implication, network analysis focusing on 
organisational networks is capable of capturing the most relevant means and structure of 
high-level rent extraction and corruption. Second, the analysed database only records 
contracts of at least 1 million HUF (or roughly 3300 EUR)
3
. Below this threshold, contracts 
are considered to be too small for high-level politics to interfere (though this does not mean 
that there is no corruption involved in their award). Third, only those organisations are 
analysed which have at least three contracts awarded in at least one of the two observation 
periods as the market behaviour of organisations with less than three contracts in a roughly 
one-and-a-half year period is generally too erratic creating random noise which inhibits 
pattern identification. This is also true for the calculation of the CRI of each transaction, by 
implication network data and corruption measurement both refer to the same sample. 
In order to harness the changing elite configuration resulting from the change of government 
in May 2010, two roughly equal time periods were selected: 1/1/2009 – 31/4/2010 capturing 
the socialist government’s almost one-and-a-half years in office and 1/1/2011 – 31/7/2012 
capturing the first roughly one-and-a-half years of the conservative government in office. 
Note that the immediate period after the change of government (1/5/2010 – 31/12/2010) is 
excluded from the analysis as it is considered to be transitory. This is because public 
procurement tenders often have around a half-year time span between launch and final 
contract award and incoming governments typically take a few months to establish their new 
                                                          
3
 Note that this threshold is below the mandatory publication threshold. This is because we applied a threshold 
of contracts, while the regulation refers to tender values (one tender can have multiple contracts awarded).  
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regime in public procurement such as implementing new rules and appointing new officials 




Table 2, the number of edges is lower than the number of contracts as any pair of 
organisations could have concluded more than one contract in each period. Multiple contracts 
between the same two actors within each period were aggregated to represent one edge per 
period, i.e. a single relationship between actors.  
The two networks are by and large of the same size with the network representing the 2011-
2012 period containing somewhat more edges and actors, but much smaller total contract 
value. This is because public procurement spending greatly decreased after the 2010 elections 
reflecting budget cuts across the whole public sector. 
The two periods are treated as two distinct networks not only because the underlying 
governing elites have almost completely changed, but also because the organisational actors 
and their positions changed fundamentally. Only about one-third of organisations are present 
in both networks (Table A1), with suppliers displaying a particularly low level of overlap 
between the two periods. These statistics are broadly in line with interview evidence pointing 
at a wholesale restructuring of the public procurement market under the new conservative 
government. In addition, the network position of organisations present in both networks 
changed considerably. 
We can claim that elite configuration under the two periods is fundamentally different as both 
the governing parties have different internal organisation and the public administration 
structures they created are very different. The socialist governments between 2002 and 2010 
consisted of a coalition of the socialist party (MSzP) and the liberal party (SzDSz) with three 
different prime ministers in the period. The party leadership has changed on multiple 
occasions in this period. The conservative party (Fidesz) formed a government de facto on its 
own in 2010 commanding two-thirds parliamentary majority, while the party has always been 
led by three-time prime minister Viktor Orbán. Although party and government leadership 
turnover and coalition governments are far from the only indicators of governing elite 
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centralisation, they both point in the same direction. The socialist governing elite was a more 
decentralised elite group than the conservative governing elite. 
This picture is further strengthened by the centralisation of the public administration under 
the conservative government. There was a strong centralising push in public services in 2010-
2012 through the reallocation of many locally managed services, such as primary and 
secondary education, and associated spending, to the centre (OECD 2011, 2015). In a similar 
vein, most local public services - such as issuing permits - which had previously been 
managed by municipalities were transferred to regional or national centres. Finally, the 
central government was reorganised into only eight ministries with three ‘top’ ministries 
managing most substantial areas. This move was openly praised by top government officials 
as a means to effective governance. Even though reorganising the state serves only as a proxy 
for elite configuration and elite preferences, it clearly points at a more centralised direction 
under the conservative government when compared with the previous socialist government. 
4. MEASURING INSTITUTIONALISED GRAND CORRUPTION: FOCUSING ON 
THE CONTRACTS BETWEEN TWO ORGANISATIONS 
The starting point for identifying state capture is to develop a robust measure of 
institutionalised grand corruption at a dyadic level; that is by looking at the relationship 
between any pair of issuers and winners. The approach follows closely the composite 
indicator building methodology developed and tested by earlier scholarship making use of a 
wide range of public procurement ‘red flags’ (Charron et al. 2016; Fazekas, Tóth, and King 
2016). 
The measurement approach exploits the fact that for institutionalised grand corruption to 
work, procurement contracts have to be awarded recurrently to companies belonging to the 
corrupt network. This can only be achieved if legally prescribed rules of fair competition and 
open access to public resources are circumvented. By implication, it is possible to identify the 
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input side of the corruption process, that is techniques used for limiting competition (e.g. 
leaving too little time for bidders to submit their bids), and also the output side of corruption, 
that is signs of limited competition: single bid received and recurrent contract award to the 
same company. By measuring the degree of unfair restriction of competition in public 
procurement, a proxy indicator of corruption can be obtained. This indicator, which we call 
the Corruption Risk Index (CRI), represents the probability of particularistic contract award 
and delivery in public procurement falling between 0 and 1 (minimal and maximal corruption 
risk respectively). Based on qualitative interviews of corruption in the public procurement 
process in Hungary as well as a review of the literature (OECD 2007; Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers 2013; World Bank 2009), we identified the components of the CRI, that is ‘red 
flags’ indicating corruption risks in public procurement (Table 3). 
Each of these is discussed briefly here:  
 One of the most straightforward ‘red flags’ of corruption is that only a single bid is 
submitted. Since we are only examining competitive markets, the apparent lack of 
competition allows for awarding contracts above market price and extracting corrupt 
rents. 
 A simple way to fix tenders is to avoid the publication of the call for tenders in the 
official public procurement journal as this makes it harder for competitors to learn 
about business opportunities and hence to prepare a bid.  
 While open competition is relatively hard to avoid in some tendering procedure types, 
such as open tender, others such as invitation tenders are by default less competitive; 
hence the selection of a less open and transparent procedure type can also indicate the 
deliberate limiting of competition, and hence corruption risks. 
 Eligibility criteria define which companies are allowed to bid. Tailoring the 
conditions to a single company is one of the most widely quoted means for corruptly 
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limiting competition. Overly complex, hence lengthy criteria, are a typical sign that 
criteria were ‘over-specified’, most likely excluding competitors. 
 If the submission period, i.e. the number of days between advertising a tender and the 
submission deadline, is too short for preparing an adequate bid, it can serve corrupt 
purposes; whereby the issuer informally tells the well-connected company about the 
opportunity much earlier.  
 To prepare bids, bidders need to access the full tender documentation for which they 
are sometimes required to pay a fee. Excessively expensive tender documentation can 
be used for corrupt purposes, as it can deter otherwise competitive bidders, especially 
smaller ones reluctant to take larger risks.  
 ‘Call for tender’ announcements provide the key document for bidding firms on 
which to base their bids. However, changes - once or multiple times  - to the bidding 
conditions, such as technical content or eligibility criteria, may signal corruption risk 
as this creates uncertainty and may deter bidders.  
 While receiving more than one bid indicates lower risk of corruption in public 
procurement, abusing administrative rules for excluding bidders can still serve corrupt 
purposes, especially when all but one bidder is excluded. Typically,  the reasons for 
such exclusions are insubstantive, such as missing page numbers or the absence of an 
official stamp on an auxiliary document. 
 Different types of evaluation criteria are prone to fiddling to different degrees. 
Subjective, hard-to-quantify criteria often accompany rigged assessment procedures 
as these create room for discretion and inhibit accountability mechanisms. 
 When the size and sector of the contract mandates an open procedure, a widely used 
corruption technique avoids open competition by deliberately derailing the first open 
procedure and re-launching the tender under an accelerated, less open procedure type 
,citing the urgency of purchase and the time lost in the unsuccessful first open tender. 
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 If the time used for deciding on the submitted bids is excessively short or lengthened 
by legal challenge, it can also signal corruption risks. Snap decisions may reflect 
premediated assessment, while legal challenge and the corresponding long decision 
period suggests outright violation of laws. 
 Most ‘red flags’ of corruption in public procurement concentrate on the bidding 
process, however, the contract implementation phase is even more prone to corruption 
due to  frequent lack of attention and clear information. Modifications to contract 
conditions signal the risk of unfair competition and corruption (i.e. non-connected 
bidders could not have foreseen the loosening of contract conditions when bidding). 
Increasing the contract value and postponing delivery dates are two particularly high-
risk signals. 
 On competitive markets, it is unlikely to have the same company winning all the 
contracts of a given issuer, hence the share of the winning company within all the 
contracts awarded by the issuer can indicate rigged competition.  
Single bidder and winner’s contract share are two outcomes of the competitive process which 
closely match the concept of institutionalised grand corruption in addition to having been 
identified as the most reliable ‘red flags’ in the literature. However, under the strict rules of 
open competition dictated by public procurement laws, the rules of the game have to be 
rigged to favour well-connected bidders. This gives rise to ‘red flags’ of the tendering process 
in conjunction with high-risk tendering outcomes. 
For continuous variables above such as the length of submission period, thresholds had to be 
identified in order to reflect the non-linear character of corruption. This is because most 
values of continuous variables can be considered as reflections of diverse market practices 
(e.g. 20 or more days for bidders to prepare their bids), while some domains of outlier values 
are more associated with corruption (e.g. only allowing five days for bid submission). 
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Thresholds were identified using regression analysis, in particular analysing residual 
distributions. 
We restricted the sample to experienced issuers of tenders on competitive markets in order to 
minimize the chances that we are measuring honest errors or inexperience rather than corrupt 
practices. Thus we only examine tenders in markets with at least three unique winners 
throughout 2009-2012, where markets are defined by product type (CPV
4
 level 3) and 
location (NUTS
5
 level 1); and issuers that have awarded at least 3 contracts in the 12 months 
period prior to the contract award in question. 
In addition to the identification of thresholds in continuous variables, regression analysis was 
used to ensure that ‘red flags’ measure corruption, and to make the indicators comparable 
across different sectors and regions (where different corruption techniques might be used). In 
this analysis, we consider ‘red flags’ as indicating corruption only if they predict (1) single 
bidder contracts and (2) winner contract share in the 12 months prior to contract award. We 
control for a number of likely confounders in these regressions. These controls are: (1)  
administrative capacity measured by number of employees of the issuer
6
, (2) institutional 
endowments measured by type of issuer (e.g. municipal, national), (3) product market and 
technological specificities measured by CPV division of products procured, (4) number of 
competitors on the market measured by the number of unique winners throughout 2009-2012 
on CPV level-3 product group and NUTS-1 geographic region, (5) contract size and length, 
and (6) regulatory regime as proxied by year of contract award. 
Some examples show the logic of analysis and our approach to interpretation  (for full details 
see: Fazekas, Tóth, and King 2016). Failing to publish the call for tenders in the official 
                                                          
4
 CPV=Common Procurement Vocabulary. For more info see: http://simap.europa.eu/codes-and-
nomenclatures/codes-cpv/codes-cpv_en.htm 
5
 NUTS=Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics. For more info see: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction 
6
 Employment data derives from national administrative databases. 
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journal increases the average probability of single received and valid bids by 12.1-14.0%; and 
it also increases the winner contract share in all contracts awarded by the issuer in the 
previous 12 months by 3.9%. These results suggest that avoiding the transparent and easily 
accessible publication of a new tender can typically be used for limiting competition to 
recurrently benefit a particular company. This implies that a call for tenders not being 
published in the official journal should be included in CRI. Similarly, leaving only five or 
fewer days, including the weekend, for bidders to submit their bids is associated with a 21.2% 
higher probability of a single bidder contract and with a 7.7% higher winner’s contract share 
compared to submission periods longer than 20 calendar days. These indicate that extremely 
short submission periods are often used for limiting competition and awarding contracts 
recurrently to the same company. These provide sufficient grounds for including this in the 
CRI. 
Following from the regression analysis each valid ‘red flag’ of corruption is identified and 
included in CRI. In addition to the outcome variables of the two regressions (single bidder 
and winner contract share) all those variables are included in CRI which are in line with a 
rent extraction logic hence proven to be significant and powerful predictors in both 
regressions.   
Once the list of elementary corruption risk indicators is determined with the help of 
regression analysis, each of the variables and their categories receive a component weight 
(Table A2). As we lack the detailed knowledge of which elementary corruption technique is a 
necessary or sufficient condition for corruption to occur, we assign equal weight to each 
variable and the sizes of regression coefficients are only used to determine the weights of 
categories within variables. For example, if there are four significant categories of a variable, 
then they are weighted 1, 0.75, 0.5, and 0.25 reflecting category ranking according to 
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coefficient size. The component weights are normed so that the observed CRI falls between 0 
and 1. 
As CRI is defined on the level of individual public procurement tenders, it is most 
appropriately used as the edge weight in the organisational contractual network. As any two 
organisations can have more than one contract linking them within the same period, edge 
weights were calculated as the unweighted arithmetic average of the contracts constituting the 
edge between the actors in the period considered. 
In order to establish that CRI proxies corruption rather than other phenomena such as low 
administrative capacity, its co-variation with five different external indicators is explored 
(Fazekas, Tóth, and King 2016). All the performed tests are confirmatory: significant and 
point in the expected direction (
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Table 4). Winning companies with the highest profit margins have 0.024 higher CRI than low 
profit-margin winning firms. Expensive purchases display a 0.071 higher CRI than the 
cheapest purchases. Both of these suggest that CRI captures institutionalised corrupt rent 
extraction resulting in higher profits from above market procurement prices. Companies with 
direct political connections have 0.011 higher CRI than companies without such ties, 
similarly companies whose market success is fundamentally altered by the change of 
government display 0.011 higher CRI than companies whose success was unaffected by the 
government change. While the difference of 0.011 CRI is of moderate magnitude, it indicates 
that high-level politics is associated with corruption risks measured by CRI. Public 
procurement winning firms which are registered in tax havens as measured by the Financial 
Secrecy Index (Tax Justice Network 2013) have 0.02 higher CRI than companies registered 
in transparent jurisdictions. 
5. IDENTIFYING STATE CAPTURE PATTERNS: FOCUSING ON 
CONTRACTUAL NETWORKS 
This section makes the leap from corruption in binary contractual relationships to state 
capture defined by organisational clusters underpinning collective action by captor groups. 
This entails, first, exploring the total contractual network in order to establish stylised facts in 
line with the hypothesized network formations (Figure 1); second, performing a cluster 
analysis using the corruption risks present in organisations’ ego networks (i.e. immediate 
neighbours in the network); and third, mapping the network position of captured and clean 
organisations identified by the prior cluster analysis. Network analysis and visualisation were 
conducted using R’s igraph package, Python’s NetworkX library and Gephi. 
The contractual networks of both periods are fundamentally similar with no substantive 
difference in elementary network summary statistics (Table A3). For example, network 
density, that is the proportion of observed ties compared to all possible ties, is 0.004 for 
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2009-2010 and 0.003 for 2011-2012; hardly any change.  This underlines the continuity of 
government contracting in spite of radical change in the structure of government since 2010. 
In order to directly project the stylised network configurations onto the empirical data, high 
and low corruption-risk contracts were denoted as those with the highest 20% CRI scores and 
those with the lowest 20% CRI scores respectively. The contracts with CRI scores around the 
mean were excluded from the representation. The resulting graph for the 2009-2010 period is 
in Figure 2. Red vertices represent suppliers and green vertices denote issuers. Node size 
reflects degree centrality (i.e. total number of direct relations a node has taking weights into 
account) and node location is a function of network closeness using the Fruchterman-
Reingold layout function. Edge width reflects corruption risks (CRI) of the contracts 
underlying each edge (average CRI edges while excluded from the representation were still 
used for calculating network distance). Underpinning the hypothesized network formations, 
there are a few clusters of organisations which tend to be linked either by low or high 
corruption-risk edges while many more have mixed relationships, both high and low CRI. 
This simple visualisation motivates the formal cluster analysis of organisational ego networks 
in order to identify clean as well as mixed cases of capture. 
We clustered supplier and issuer organisations based on each organisation’s average CRI and 
the relative standard deviation of CRI (clustering procedures carried out with Stata 12.0: 
cluster command). The first clustering variable captures the overall level of corruption risks 
in an organisation, while the second indicates how consistently the organisation behaves. 
Thus, clustering based on these two variables allowed to capture the degree to which each 
organisation’s ego network fits the homogenous or heterogeneous corruption patterns 





 instead revealed four groups with two intermediate cases instead of 
one
8
 (Table 5): 
 Clean organisations: low average corruption with low variability of performance; 
 Occasionally corrupt organisations: low average corruption with highly variable 
performance indicating that there are occasional deviations from the low corruption 
standard contracting practice; 
 Partial capture: high average corruption with high variability indicating that there are 
still low corruption contracts which, nevertheless, represent the deviation from a high 
corruption norm. 
 Full capture: high average corruption with low variability of performance indicating 
that corrupt exchanges represent the norm in the organisation’s contracting practice. 
Comparing the two periods, there is no considerable difference in terms of proportions of 
each group: about 60% of organisations are partially or fully captured in Hungary (Table A4). 
This is a surprisingly high figure, but it also signals that the Hungarian state is not fully 
captured, but rather that there is a range of organisations with mixed track records. This 
indicates that the norm of ethical universalism is only partially established and there are 
organisations where opposing norms conflict. 
After establishing that there is a considerable degree of organisation-level capture in 
Hungary, the final step is to gauge the degree of state capture at the inter-organisational level. 
Hence, we search for communities or cohesive sub-groups in the whole network which 
denote groups of contracting entities and winning firms which are more densely connected to 
                                                          
7
 We first implemented a hierarchical clustering procedure to identify the optimal number of clusters 
simultaneously for both periods (relying on Calinski/ Harabasz pseudo-F and Duda/Hart indices). Final clusters 
were identified implementing k-means clustering. Euclidian distance was used. Hierarchical clustering indices 
are reported in Appendix B. 
8
 The three cluster solution is only slightly less preferable to the four cluster division which nevertheless only 




each other than to the rest of the network. In order to identify such communities, we employ a 
so-called modularity measure which measures how good a given community definition is by 
comparing the number of links within each community compared against the expectation of a 
random but comparable network
9
. The more links stay within the community relative to the 
outside world, the greater the modularity (and the more separated various communities are in 
the graph). This approach applied to the public procurement contracting network of Hungary 
(2009-2010) highlights the existence of distinct cohesive sub-groups (Figure 3). 
The existence of some cohesive sub-groups is not a surprise given the strong geographical 
and market-driven patterns in government contracting. However, what is surprising and 
points heavily towards state capture at the level of communities is that there are a number of 
communities which predominantly consist of organisations earlier denoted as partially or 
fully captured (in 2009-2010, 32% of organisations belong to a community where captured 
organisations make up more than two-thirds). These are organisations which are not only 
captured based on the corruption risks in their own contracting activities, but they also 
extensively contract among themselves rather than with organisations outside their captured 
community. Formal tests confirm that community membership and belonging to the captured 
or non-captured organisation types are significantly associated (for 2009-2010, Pearson’s 
chi2 and likelihood ratio chi2 tests are significant at the 0.001 level, Cramer’s V=0.2). 
In Hungary, where some degree of state capture is expected (Innes 2014), the proposed 
methodology identified and precisely located this phenomenon on the organisational level as 
well as in relation to groups of organisations. The findings reveal a graduated and dynamic 
picture instead of traditional, rather monolithic approaches to state capture: there are varying 
degrees of capture at the organisational level, there are different network formations of 
                                                          
9
 A random, but comparable network was obtained by randomly re-allocating the ties between nodes, while 
preserving the structural characteristics of the network such as number of nodes or the degree distribution 
(number of ties each node has). 
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captured organisations with some forming densely connected communities, and these 
fundamental patterns of state capture dynamically change from 2009-2010 to 2011-2012 
when a new government comes to power. 
6. LINKING STATE CAPTURE PATTERNS TO ELITE CONFIGURATION 
While the previous section demonstrated the logic of measuring state capture in government 
contracting based on the network structure of corrupt transactions and actors, here we apply 
the framework to explore a simple hypothesis: The elite centralisation of 2011-2012 in 
Hungary made captured organisations more central in the network (H1). The aim is merely to 
demonstrate the capacity of the proposed approach to contribute to hypothesis testing. 
In order to formally test the centralisation hypothesis, we look at how network position is 
associated with corruption risks as well as how organisational clusters are located at different 
network positions in the two periods. We use two intuitive concepts to gauge network 
position: closeness centrality and local clustering coefficient (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 
2013; Opsahl 2013). Closeness centrality captures how far a given node is from all other 
nodes, as a node in the centre of a graph is the one with the shortest distance from the rest of 
the graph. Local clustering captures the density of connections in any given node’s immediate 
network. 
First, we regressed closeness
10
 and local clustering on CRI while controlling for organisation 
type and number of contracts awarded or received (
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. Results point at the non-linear and changing relationship over time between 
closeness centrality and corruption risks (models 1 and 3). Closeness became a stronger 
predictor of CRI in 2011-2012 than in 2009-2010 with the upward sloping linear component 
becoming more than 5-times larger and the negative quadratic component also increasing in 
magnitude (See Appendix C for graphical representations of these changing non-linear 
relationships). The association between local clustering and CRI changes even more 
distinctively, while the relationship is significant positive in 2009-2010, it turns into very 
small insignificant in 2011-2012. Taken together
12
, the change of government changed the 
relationship between network position and corruption risks. On the one hand, 2009-2010 was 
characterised by densely connected sub-centres being the most corrupt, with central nodes 
being less corrupt. On the other hand, 2011-2012 was characterised by sub-centres without 
any distinct corruption risk level, and central nodes becoming relatively more corrupt even 
though they remained less corrupt than the periphery. These associations, while very 
elementary and explaining only some of the total variance, lend some support to hypothesis 
H1 with centralisation and the break-up of local corruption clusters when the government 
changes. They also coincide with qualitative accounts of how the prime minister entering 
office in 2010 increasingly centralised decisions over government contracts, carefully sharing 
all major projects among two or three of his closest associates. 
Second, we directly utilize the identified state capture formations by mapping organisational 
clusters’ average network position (
                                                          
11
 The regressions are run on a restricted sample excluding all the disconnected tiny sub-graphs as their 
network characteristics are atypical, and they can bias closeness measures (Opsahl, Agneessens, and Skvoretz 
2010). For 2009-2010 4%, for 2011-2012 6% of the nodes were removed. 
12
 Closeness and clustering weren’t entered at the same time in the regressions as they are highly collinear. 
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Table 7). The above arguments in favour of H1 are further underpinned by the decreasing 
local clustering of the clean organisation type, i.e. non-captured organisations became more 
dispersed across the whole network. Average closeness decreased markedly from 2009-2010 
to 2011-2012, with fully captured organisations decreasing in their average closeness the 
least, i.e. in terms of their relative position in the network, they became more central. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
The discussion and analysis so far have pointed out the feasibility and usefulness of 
measuring corruption using transaction-level public procurement data and linking this 
corruption indicator to state capture. Further validating work should shed more light on the 
reliability and validity of this approach. Applying the measurement framework to a 
straightforward research problem provided further evidence for its relevance, although it was 
not possible to extensively test the centralisation hypothesis. 
Regarding the causal link between elite composition and the structure of state capture, there 
is a crucial limitation. It is unclear to what degree the centralisation of corruption and state 
capture is the function of the reorganisation of the public administration or the governing elite 
structure. These two events would have equivalent consequences in network terms and they 
happened at the same time. However, differentiating the two causal pathways is irrelevant as 
long as the main concern is the change in state capture and the consequences it has for the 
society. In addition, as CRI primarily measures outright corruption and lack of competition, 
more sophisticated, organised forms of corruption remain largely undetected. If the structure 
of state capture and network position of corrupt transactions are related to the sophistication 
of corruption techniques, our results are likely to be biased. 
State capture is established daily practice in approximately 60% of public sector 
organisations conducting public procurement in a relatively well-governed middle-income 
country, Hungary. Providing large amounts of external funding such as EU Funds in such a 
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governance context is likely to further increase rents extracted and captor groups’ capacity to 
compromise good governance. The systemic and networked nature of political corruption 
makes any administrative fixes to corruption likely to fail. Instead, a big-bang approach to 
anticorruption, i.e. simultaneous reforms in every major policy area, may be a more realistic 
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Figure 1. Typical network configurations of corruption and state capture 
(i) corruption free state (ii) corruption without state capture 
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Note : node colours represent membership in distinct cohesive sub-groups, node size scales linearly in CRI, and the layout is 
generated by the ForceAtlas2 algorithm in Gephi. Vertices repulse one another like magnets or charged particles, while 
edges, like springs, pull together the vertices they connect. Strongly connected groups of vertices tend to bunch. spatial 





Table 1. Main statistics of the analysed data – contracts 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Total number of contracts awarded 10918 17914 14070 10342 53244 
Total number of unique winners 3987 5617 5587 4923 13557 
Total number of unique issuers 1718 2871 2808 2344 5519 
Combined value of awarded contracts (million EUR) * 4604 3834 1856 1298 11592 
Source: PP 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics of network sizes of the two periods, 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 
 
N contract N issuer N winner N edge total contract value (million EUR)* 
2009-2010M4 8121 887 1244 5365 2,089.75 
2011-2012M7 7748 973 1491 5602 991.44 
Source: PP 





Table 3. Summary of corruption inputs (higher score indicates greater likelihood of corruption) 
phase indicator name indicator definition 
submission 
Single bidder contract* 
0=more than one bid received  
1=ONE bid received 
Call for tender not published in 
official journal 
0=call for tender published in official journal 
1=NO call for tenders published in official journal 
Procedure type 
0 =open procedure 
1=invitation procedure 
2=negotiation procedure 
3=other procedures (e.g. competitive dialogue) 
4=missing/erroneous procedure type 
Relative length of eligibility criteria 
number of characters of the eligibility criteria MINUS 
average number of characters of the given market's 
eligibility criteria 
Length of submission period 
number of days between publication of call for tenders 
and submission deadline 
Relative price of tender 
documentation 
price of tender documentation DIVIDED BY contract value 
Call for tenders modification 
0=call for tenders NOT modified 
1=call for tenders modified 
assessment 
Exclusion of all but one bid 
0=at least two bids NOT excluded  
1=all but one bid excluded 
Weight of non-price evaluation 
criteria 
proportion of NON-price related evaluation criteria 
within all criteria 
Annulled procedure re-launched 
subsequently** 
0=contract awarded in a NON-annulled procedure  
1=contract awarded in procedure annulled, but re-
launched 
Length of decision period 
number of working days between submission deadline 
and announcing contract award 
delivery 
Contract modification 
0=contract NOT modified during delivery  
1=contract modified during delivery 
Contract lengthening 
relative contract extension (days of extension/days of 
contract length) 
Contract value increase 
relative contract price increase (change in contract 
value/original, contracted contract value) 
* The single bidder indicator is simultaneously an outcome of the submission phase and an input to the assessment phase. 




Table 4. Summary of validity tests using external indicators, significant relationships (p<0.001) 
indicator reference group comparison group CRI diff. 
winner annual profit margin profit margin<1.44 profit margin>5.15 0.024 
ratio of contract value to 
estimated contract value 
price ratio<0.9 0.9<price ratio<1 0.071 
political connections of winning 
firms 





government dependent market 
success of firm 





firm registered in tax heaven FSI<=58.5 FSI>58.5 0.020 




Table 5. Clusters’ mean value of the clustering variables, Hungary, 2009-2012 
 
2009M1 – 2010M4 2011M1 – 2012M7 
cluster/stat CRI(stand.) Relative st.dev.of CRI CRI(stand.) Relative st.dev.of CRI 
clean 0.268 0.103 0.226 0.117 
occasional corruption 0.242 0.517 0.240 0.481 
partial capture 0.304 0.304 0.314 0.282 
full capture 0.549 0.140 0.459 0.119 





Table 6. Linear regressions on average organisational CRI, coefficients and t values are reported, Hungary, 2009-2012 





CRI CRI CRI CRI 
closeness 119917***  675949***  
closeness squared -4756869***  -51838809***  
local clustering coefficient  0.159***  0.00598 
type of organisation=supplier 0.0014 -0.00784 -0.0211*** -0.0354*** 
nr. of contracts awarded/won 0.00095*** 0.00036** 0.00047**  -0.000933*** 
constant -755*** 0.223*** -2203*** 0.308*** 
N 2052 2052 2313 2313 
R2 0.426 0.0345 0.331 0.037 
Source: PP 
Note: significance test obtained using Monte-Carlo random permutation simulations with stata 12.0 (300 permutations); * 








closeness local clustering closeness local clustering 
clean 0.01284 0.24 0.00658 0.18 
occasionally corrupt 0.01286 0.15 0.00658 0.26 
partial capture 0.01285 0.14 0.00658 0.16 
full capture 0.01279 0.26 0.00656 0.25 







(ONLINE) APPENDIX A – ADDITIONAL TABLES  
 
Table A1. Overlap of organisations in the networks of the two periods, Hungary, 2009-2012 
periods 
N % 
total issuers suppliers total issuers suppliers 
2009-2010 only 1,057 381 676 30.02 28.14 31.2 
2011-2012 only 1,392 469 923 39.53 34.64 42.59 
both periods 1,072 504 568 30.45 37.22 26.21 






TableA2. Component weights of CRI reflecting variable and category impact on corruption outcomes, normed to have an 
overall sum of 1 
Variable component weight 
single received/valid bid 0.096 
no call for tenders published in official journal 0.096 
procedure type 
 
ref. cat.=open procedure 0.000 
1=invitation procedure 0.048 
2=negotiation procedure 0.072 
3=other procedures 0.096 
4=missing/erroneous procedure type 0.024 
relative length of eligibility criteria 
 
ref.cat.=length<-2922.125 0.000 
1= -2922.125<length<=520.7038 0.024 
2= 520.7038<length<=2639.729 0.048 
3= 2639.729<length 0.072 
4= missing length 0.096 
short submission period 
 
ref.cat.=normal submission period 0.000 
1=accelerated submission period 0.048 
2=exceptional submission period 0.072 
3=except. submission per. abusing weekend 0.096 
4=missing submission period 0.024 
relative price of tender documentation 
 
ref.cat.= relative price=0 0.000 
1= 0<relative price<=0.0004014 0.000 
2= 0.0004014<relative price<=0.0009966 0.096 
3= 0.0009966<relative price<=0.0021097 0.064 
4= 0.0021097<relative price 0.032 
5=missing relative price 0.000 
call for tenders modification(only before 01/05/2010) 0.096 
weight of non-price evaluation criteria 
 
ref.cat.= only price 0.000 
2= 0<non-price criteria weight<=0.4 0.000 
3= 0.4<non-price criteria weight<=0.556 0.048 
4= 0.556<non-price criteria weight<1 0.096 
5=only non-price criteria 0.000 
procedure annulled and re-launched subsequently 0.096 
length of decision period 
 
ref.cat.= 44<decision period<=182 0.000 
1= decision period<=32 0.064 
2= 32<decision period<=44 0.032 
4= 182<decision period 0.096 
5= missing decision period 0.000 
contract modified during delivery 0.096 
contract extension(length/value) 
 
ref.cat.= c.length diff.<=0 AND c.value diff.<=0.001 0.000 
2= 0<c. length d.<=0.162 OR 0.001<c.value d.<=0.24 0.096 
3= 0.162<c. length diff. OR 0.24<c.value diff. 0.000 
4= missing (with contr. completion ann.) 0.048 
5= missing (NO contr. completion ann.) 0.000 
winner's market share 0.096 
Source: PP 
Note: If the call for tenders or contract fulfilment announcements are missing, the index is reweighted to only reflect the 





Table A3. Elementary network descriptive statistics per period, Hungary, 2009-2012 
 
Density Avg. Dist. Diameter Transitivity. 
2009M1-2010M4 0.004 5.284 13 0.277 






Table A4. Number and proportions of organisations in the four clusters, Hungary, 2009-2012 
 
2009M1 – 2010M4 2011M1 – 2012M7 
cluster/stat N % cum. % N % cum. % 
clean 447 24.9 25 430 22.3 22 
occasional corruption 319 17.8 43 296 15.3 38 
partial capture 674 37.6 80 817 42.4 80 
full capture 352 19.6 100 381 19.8 100 











(ONLINE) APPENDIX B – CLUSTERING CALCULATIONS 
 




2009M1 – 2010M4 2011M1 – 2012M7 
2 267.37 94.85 
3 433 190.96 
4 293.49 141.98 
5 225.78 108.23 
6 515.16 260.05 
7 600.67 282.02 
8 521.25 244.14 
9 696.64 463.33 
10 839.87 604.57 
11 795.74 545.44 
12 758.92 582.08 
13 818.94 587.15 
14 776.07 622.9 
15 721.61 802.92 
 










2009M1 – 2010M4 2011M1 – 2012M7 
1 0.87 267.37 0.953 94.85 
2 0.7709 516.86 0.8748 272.96 
3 0.8466 24.46 0.2396 117.41 
4 0.5772 35.89 0.3137 26.25 
5 0.5991 1072.14 0.7284 696.9 
6 0.7278 408.1 0.375 525.1 
7 0.6213 26.21 0.33 42.63 
8 0.5569 727.33 0.6135 977.74 
9 0.4472 629.18 0.6133 668.37 
10 0.6169 81.96 0.9611 7.4 
11 0.6681 121.72 0.671 240.29 
12 0.5381 301.32 0.5231 212.4 
13 0.7021 45.82 0.5709 302.84 
14 0.0046 216.49 0.5954 594.63 





(ONLINE) APPENDIX C – CRI AND CLOSENESS BIVARIATE 
RELATIONSHIP 
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